Grand Strategy, as defined by Colin Gray, comprises  the "purposeful employment of all instruments of power available to a security community”. As opposed to tactics, or general military strategy, grand strategy looks at a nation’s security from a 50,000 foot view and not a ground view.  In the past, a nation usually looked no further than their own neighbors (allies or enemies). For instance, the grand strategy of Napoleon was focused mainly on the European continent. All other theatres of operations such as the Americas, Asia, and India were considered secondary to Europe. This was a much different point of view as compared to Great Britain, which has vital interests spread across the globe. This difference of focus was to doom Napoleon in the long run. The same could be said of Hitler and Japan during the 1930s and 1940s. Both were too focused on their own regional theatre of operations to ever coordinate their 1941 offensives.  If Japan and Germany focused on the destruction the United Kingdom as a super-power, Germany would have foregone its invasion of the Soviet Union and chose the Mediterranean as a likely battle ground; Japan would have likewise avoided a confrontation with the US and chose a southern strategy. Against such odds, the UK would have had likely been knocked out of the war, or at the very least neutralized as a super power.

This brings us to the current problems facing the Obama Administration.  Let me say this first, the final authority or author of a nation’s grand strategy lies within the civilian realm. Even in Hitler’s Third Reich, the Werhmacht didn’t set policy –Hitler did. In the old Prussian tradition, the King and Defense Minister (who was usually a very senior Prussian staff officer) shared this duty. But in the United States, especially after World War II, the obligation as well the privilege of setting grand strategy always officially resides in the Oval Office. The President since 1949 has an entire bureaucracy that does nothing but theorize, plan, and implement grand strategy. Whether this power resides in the office of the National Security Advisor, The State Department, or the Pentagon depends upon the President. In Nixon’s case, it was Henry Kissinger –first as National Security Advisor and then as Secretary of State.  For Reagan, it was a George Schultz and Caspar Weinberger. In both the case of Nixon and Reagan, the Presidents themselves took a leading role, and put their imprimatur on their policies. President Bush the junior relied initially on Rumsfeld the Defense Secretary, but over time added Condoleezza Rice and various UN and NATO offices.  President Obama, a man who never advertised himself as a foreign policy expert, is following the traditions of Reagan and Nixon. And he is finding out how lonely it is at the top.

One of the fantasies that should be dispensed with is the narrative that President Obama is only trying to get the strategy right. The President announced in March his long term strategy vis-à-vis East Asia. We know now that in 2008 President Bush ordered an over-all re-evaluation of Afghanistan, and that revaluation was waiting for the Obama Administration in January. From the looks of it, President Obama accepted the policy recommendations and then some. In June, he abruptly fired General McKiernan and replaced him with a counter-insurgency specialist in General McChrystal.  He also gave McChrystal an additional 16,000 combat troops. General McChrystal promised the President a report in August, which he delivered on time. From that point on, it’s been like Alice in Wonderland, or Abbot and Costello (Who’s on First?). After a flurry of well placed leaks, political recrimination, and political gotcha ensued. Finally, the President said he wishes to go slowly on this and “get it right”. Of course, the logical rejoinder is, “What have you been doing these last nine months?” The President, in essence, is telling the world that he is re-thinking his strategy on Afghanistan which he so eloquently laid out in March. It is too bad he failed to mention this to Secretary of Defense Gates, CENTCOM Commander Petreous, or General McChrystal.

For those who understand the principals of simple military strategy, it is almost impossible for a theatre commander like McChrystal to devise a military strategy without having the grand strategy laid out in a formal no nonsense plan. FDR did this after we went to war when he ordered General Marshall to put his focus on the European Theatre of Operations and not the Pacific. This simple decision controlled how the Pentagon allocated and deployed its forces. Yet, once a decision is made, it can become very difficult to change it once the subordinate branches begin to plan. Things can get even more difficult when active operations are on-going (such as they are in Afghanistan). General McChrystal has the unenviable task of at least stabilizing his area of operations while planning his next major move from scratch. Now he must also take into account second guessing from the Oval Office. For 90-120 days he has been planning his next major move on the certainty he would be given the resources to do the job. This is much more difficult than what meets the eye. His forces are already dispersed; rotation of existing forces continue as before; and one cannot plan for the kind of counter-insurgency he has in mind without securing logistical points; administrative centers, as well as gathering operational intelligence. In Iraq, General Petreous and he were given everything they needed and only one demand –win the war. What President Obama is doing is upsetting the established protocols. The end result is chaos, loss of morale in the troops, and possibly disaster.

If news accounts are accurate, it appears there are several people in the loop concerning this change in strategy. The President obviously is taking advice from his political team of Emmanuel and Axelrod; Vice President Biden also appears to have some leverage here. But what of General Jones (USMC ret), the President’s National Security Advisor? Or what of Secretary Gates, the President’s Defense Secretary? From his public utterances, he is as out of the loop as General’s Petreous and McChrystal. Now, out of the blue, we are talking about smaller footprints, special operations, and drones. None of this makes any sense from an operational perspective, and smells of pure politics. The President obviously is feeling the heat from his political base; however, he differentiated himself from both his primary opponents and McCain in that he could do Afghanistan better. To everyone who paid attention, the President promised over and over again that he would defeat both the Taliban and Al Qaida in Afghanistan. His military leaders told him the best way to do it, but all of a sudden Vice President Biden and Rahm Emmanuel know better.

General McChrystal laid out his force requirements. Some say President Obama will split the difference between what McChrystal wants, and what his liberal base demands. Instead of 40,000 additional troops, the General will get 20,000. These half measures have a way to lead to more half measures, and if 20,000 troops turn out no to be enough, will the President be willing to order more? If the operation fails due to a lack of resources, will the President be willing to take the blame?  Will General McChrystal resign if he doesn’t get the resources he needs?

Again, much of the contention lies at the feet of the President. He is the one who sets grand strategy. If he had doubts about the so-called surge strategy (a strategy that requires many more troops that on currently on the ground now), why didn’t he voice said concerns last spring? Why hire General McChrystal at all? Why is he having high visibility meetings concerning Afghanistan now and not last March? Why are so many of his key policy advisors out of the loop? The shadows of Vietnam certainly hang over the Whitehouse now.